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This paper analyzes the role of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina for the promotion of social justice under the conditions of a triple 
transformation from war to peace and from a communist regime based on the 
Titoist self-management ideology to a liberal-democratic political regime and 
economic market system in three parts. The first section describes the political, 
constitutional and economic context during and after the collapse of the former 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
The second section describes and analyzes the constitutional and institutional 
arrangements established under the General Framework Agreement for Peace, 
concluded in Dayton/Ohio and Paris, 1995. The third section deals with the 
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interpretative doctrines developed in its adjudication of the right to property 
concerning different concepts of property and the right to work in the context 
of the constitutionally guaranteed right to return of refugees and restitution of 
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE HISTORIC AND POLITICAL CONTEXT
With the process of dissolution of the former Socialist Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (SFRY), which had been established by the victorious Yugoslav 
Communist Party after the end of the Second World War, the Socialist Republic 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, having been one of the six federal entities of SFRY, 
was in a particularly difficult sandwich position in 1991. According to Lenin´s 
and Stalin´s model for communist federations,1 the federal entities of SFRY had 
constitutionally been seen as constitutive entities with the `ethnic´ majority 
population on the respective territory conceived as the state-forming nation for 
the respective `Yugoslav´ republics, namely Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Macedonia 
and Montenegro. However, as an exception from the rule and due to the historic 
legacy of the Ottoman and the Habsburg empires and the ensuing demographic 
situation with no ethnic group in an absolute majority position, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina could never be considered to be the state of one state-forming 
nation with other groups in the position of national minorities. Hence, three 
major groups, Muslims, originally categorized as a religious, not `national´ group,2 
Serbs, and Croats were seen as `constitutive´ for this Yugoslav republic. In order 
to counteract centrifugal forces following from the state and nation building 
processes not only in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), but all over Europe in the 
19th and the 20th centuries, the Yugoslav Communist Party, under its victorious 
slogan Bratstvo i Jedinstvo (Brotherhood and Unity), took over a de facto system 
of proportional representation and participation of these three groups in all of 
the republican institutions.3 This system had already been developed under the 
Habsburg political system as conflict prevention mechanism, but was not taken 
over in the period between the two world wars with the establishment of the 
Kingdom of Serbs-Croats-Slovenes immediately after the First World War and its 
1 Bill Bowring, The Degradation of the International Legal Order? The Rehabilitation of Law and the Possibility of 
Politics (New York: Routledge and Cavendish, 2008), 13-20. 
2 Most authors on the history of state and nation building in Yugoslavia follow the official communist doctrine 
and party history that muslims with a lower-case `m´ were a religious, but not ethnic, group and thus legally 
recognized as an (ethnically conceived) nation only through the Republican Constitution of 1974, henceforth 
Muslims with a capital `M.´ 
3 Mirsad Abazović, Nacionalni aspekti kadrova u BiH 1945-1991 [National Aspects of the Formation of Cadres in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1945-1991] (Sarajevo: Bibliotheka Posebna Izdanja, br. 66, 2000).
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transformation into the Yugoslav kingdom in 1927, both characterized by Greater 
Serbian aspirations for hegemony. Finally, in the course of transformation from 
a communist one-party system to a multi-party system in 1990, this institutional 
mechanism became constitutionally entrenched and formed the basis for the 
first multi-party elections in November 1990. However, due to the strong ethnic 
polarization of society with the foundation of political parties along ethno-
national lines, the results of these elections resembled more a census.4
Hence, with the final breakdown of Communist Yugoslavia in the course 
of 1991 and the wars in Slovenia and Croatia in summer and fall of 1991,5 the 
newly elected tripartite Muslim/Serb/Croat government faced a problematic 
impasse when trying to remain `neutral´ and therefore `independent´ from any 
of the war-faring parties: on the one hand, both Muslim and Croat party leaders 
were afraid of being left over in a Serb-dominated `rump Yugoslavia´ under 
the leadership of the no longer socialist, but nationalist-authoritarian regime 
having been established by Slobodan Milošević in the Republics of Serbia and 
Montenegro, whereas, on the other, the political leader of the Serb Democratic 
Party (SDS) in BiH, Radovan Karadžić, threatened war in case of a declaration 
of independence by a majority vote of Muslim and Croat representatives in 
parliament. All efforts to reach a political compromise failed and a fully fledged 
war broke out in BiH in April 1992.6  
What are the consequences of the following four years of war in BiH, 
stopped only by NATO-intervention based on a UN-Security Council mandate 
and followed by the Dayton Peace Agreement of December 1995?7 Already during 
4 See Joseph Marko, “Defective Democracy in a Failed State? Bridging Constitutional Design, Politics and Ethnic 
Division in Bosnia-Herzegovina,” in Practising Self-Government: A Comparative Study of Autonomous Regions, 
eds. Yash Gai and Sophia Woodman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 286.
5 I have analyzed the political processes leading to the collapse of the SFRY in detail in Joseph Marko, “Processes 
of ethnic mobilization in the former Yugoslav Republics reconsidered,” Southeastern Europe 34, no.1 (2010).
6 See Joseph Marko, “Autonomy or Partition? The Ethno-National Effects of Territorial Delimitation in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina,” in Local-Self-Government, Territorial Integrity and Protection of Minorities, ed. Swiss Institute 
of Comparative Law, Publications of the Swiss Institute of Comparative Law (Zurich: Schulthess, 1996); Sabrina 
P. Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building and Legitimitation, 1919-1992 (Washington: Indiana University 
Press, 2006), in particular 381-469.
7 The following description has been elaborated in detail by Marko, “Defective Democracy”, fn 4 and Joseph Marko, 
"Ethnopolitics and Constitutional Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina," in Bosnia-Herzegovina since Dayton: Civic 
and Uncivic Values, eds. Ola Listhaug and Sabrina P. Ramet (Ravenna: Longo Editore, 2013). 
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the war, three new political units came into being. First, under the political 
leadership of R. Karadžić and the SDS, a new state, called `Republika Srpska´ 
(RS; not to be confused with the Republic of Serbia) was finally created by 
secession from the already internationally recognised Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in April 1992. Through military attack going hand in hand with 
ethnic cleansing, the military forces of RS, composed of the former Serb military 
personnel of the Yugoslav army from BiH, held around 70 per cent of the entire 
territory of BiH until 1995. The second political unit, called `Herceg-Bosna´, was 
established in July 1992 by the political leaders of the Croatian party HDZ in 
those parts of Herzegovina that were defended by so-called `Croatian Defence 
Forces´ and which formed, at the beginning of the war, a military alliance with 
the army of the Republic of BiH under the political leadership of its president, 
Alija Izetbegović, a Muslim. However, after a war within the war had broken 
out between the Muslim dominated government forces and the Croat Defence 
Forces in 1993, a third political unit, the `Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina´ 
(FBiH) was created under strong pressure of the American administration through 
the Washington Agreement of April 1994. Whereas the war constitution of RS 
provided for a strong central state without any legal reference to ethnic groups, 
the constitution of FBiH provided for a bi-national federal state of Muslims, 
having renamed themselves in 1993 into Bosniacs, and Croats. This federation 
was also territorially delimited into so-called cantons. Eight of these cantons were 
populated with either Bosniac or Croat majority population, only two of them 
were called mixed cantons with no clear-cut majority population. At the federal 
level, the constitutional provisions introduced an ethno-national power sharing 
system for the legislative and executive powers, but also for the judiciary. In 
addition, the Washington Agreement also provided for a Confederation between 
the newly independent Republic of Croatia and FBiH. 
In conclusion, before the end of the war the territorial and institutional make 
up of political units on the territory of BiH were characterized by a high degree 
of territorial and functional asymmetry. In addition, two neighboring states, 
Croatia and the so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, composed of Serbia 
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and Montenegro, both of them under the control of S. Milošević, were parties 
to the conflict, and there were many efforts of international organizations, in 
particular the United Nations, and the United States to mediate. However, only 
after the genocide against 8000 Muslim men and boys committed in Srebrenica 
in July 1995, they were also ready to intervene militarily in order to stop the war. 
Not only had the war caused approximately 100.000 casualities. Almost 
half of the 4.5 million pre-war inhabitants of BiH had become refugees all over 
Europe, Canada, the US and Australia or internally displaced persons (IDPs) by 
the end of 1995. It can be seen from figures commissioned from the UNHCR 
and the OSCE by the judge rapporteur for the case No. U-5/98 (see below) of 
the newly established Constitutional Court of BiH, also the demographic make-
up of BiH had completely changed from a multicultural society with Muslims/
Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs living in all of the municipalities of the former 
Socialist Republic of BiH to a strictly ethnically divided society and territorally 
delimited along ethno-national lines as a consequence of genocide and ethnic 
cleansing during the war. 
A comparison of population figures based on the last census in 1991 with 
1997 UNHRC figures reported in the Constitutional Court´s case No. U-5/98, 
Partial Decision III,8 demonstrates that the number of Serbs increased from 54.3 
to 96.8% on the territory of RS, whereas the number of Bosniacs dropped from 
28.7 to 2.2% and the number of so-called `Others´ from 7.5% to zero (§ 86). 
Similar figures demonstrate the effect of ethnic cleansing in FBiH, in particular 
with the numbers of Serbs decreasing from 17.6 to 2.3% (§ 92). What has been 
overlooked, however, in most scholarly literature concerning the effects of the 
war, is the degree of ethnic homogenization of the legislative, executive and 
judicial institutions in those newly established political entities. Again, the 
figures commissioned for the case No. U-5/98 are self-evident, in particular 
for the law enforcement bodies: in RS 97.6% of all judges and prosecutors and 
93% of all police officers were of Serb origin (§ 130). In FBiH there was a strong 
8 Published in Official Gazette of BiH, Nr. 23/00. All decisions with concurring and dissenting opinions are also 
published on the webpage of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina www.ustavnisud.ba., accessed on 
18 August 2019. 
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preponderance of Bosniac judges and prosecutors with 71.72 % in relation to 
23.26% of Croat origin, whereas only 5.0% of Serb origin were left in these 
bodies. The figures for the police forces are similar with slightly more Croats, 
but only 1.22% Serbs (§ 136). 
In addition, after the end of the war with the General Framework Agreement 
for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (GFAP), 14 December 1995,9 there was – 
with the exception of police forces – no lustration of the entire civil service, the 
media or the educational system at all territorial levels so that, for instance, pupils 
could still learn in 2004 from history or geography textbooks in use in RS or the 
Croat majority cantons of FBiH that `their´ President is either S. Milošević or 
F. Tudjman with the respective capitals of the, however, neighbouring countries, 
i.e. Belgrade and Zagreb. 
As far as socio-economic conditions are concerned, the entire institutional 
make up after the Dayton Peace Agreement remained not only strictly ethnically 
divided, but also created a huge, expensive state machinery with more than 1000 
ministers at the level of cantons, entities and the state of BiH for a population 
of 3.5 million inhabitants after the war. This huge bureaucratic apparatus is 
and remains highly ineffective due to the complex allocation of competences 
and the ethnic divisions so that BiH remains aid dependent and thus without 
investment driven and sustainable economic development to this day. As can be 
seen from long-term trends, there was and still remains also a highly ethnically 
divided private labor market and official data delivered by the World Bank show 
an average value in the unemployment rate of 25.06% between 1991 and 2018 
with the highest value of 31.11% in 2006.10 However, as can be seen from reports, 
youth unemployment is even officially much higher and purportedly one of the 
highest world wide with approximately more than 60%.  
“This climate is linked to the political situation”, a figurehead in the Bosnian 
youth NGO sector argues, “instability, corruption, and complicated bureaucratic 
9 See the text reprinted in International Legal Materials, 35, no.1 (1996), 75-168. 
10 See “Bosnia and Herzegovina/Unemployment rate”, The Global Economy, accessed August 18, 2019, https://
www.theglobaleconomy.com/Bosnia-and-Herzegovina/Unemployment_rate.
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procedure for development of new businesses or foreign investments.” Then the 
report goes on: 
It is this complex maze that youth looking for jobs must navigate; with most 
of the few employment opportunities secured through political connections 
and personal networks. As such, many qualified, well educated youth – 
especially those who are loath to give in to the political divisions – are left 
empty-handed after months of job searching. Most of the private-sector 
jobs that do exist offer very low wages and poor working conditions. ... The 
black economy – in which workers do not receive social security, health 
insurance, or pension payments from their employers – is ubiquitious. So 
the country now finds itself facing a significant brain drain, with educated, 
skilled youth deciding that it is easier to look for jobs outside the country 
... About 150.000 young people have left since the war ended in 1995, with 
10.000 leaving each year. Bosnians living abroad send home remittances that 
represent 13 percent of the country´s GDP, one of the world´s highest rate.11
Against this political and socio-economic background, we have thus to see 
what the role of the judiciary, in particular of a constitutional court, can be in 
terms of social justice in a society in a three-fold transition from war to peace 
and from a communist regime with a more or less centrally planned economy 
to a liberal democracy based on a market economy. 
II. THE POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM 
As the title of the GFAP indicates, this is a framework agreement whose details 
are spelled out in eleven annexes concerning military matters, the rebuilding 
of state institutions, reconstruction of the war-torn economy and the return of 
refugees and IDPs with a strong international involvement for the achievement of 
these goals. Annex 3 of the GFAP regulates the first free multiparty elections after 
the war which had to be organized by the OSCE. Annex 6 establishes a Human 
Rights Commission, to be composed of an international Ombudsperson and a 
Human Rights Chamber, a body composed of fourteen judges, with a majority 
of eight judges including the President to be appointed by the Committee of 
11 See “Why Bosnia has world´s highest youth unemployment rate,” Youth Economic Opportunities, accessed August 
18, 2019, https://youtheconomicopportunities.org/blog/2971/why-bosnia-has-worlds-highest-youth-unemployment-
rate.
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Ministers of the Council of Europe. Annex 7 regulates the rights and duties 
for the return of refugees and IDPs to their homes of origin and establishes a 
Real Property Claims Commission to adjudicate on property issues or disputes 
in this regard. Annex 10 establishes an international High Representative (HR) 
to oversee and implement the entire civilian aspects of the peace accord and 
Annex 11 arranges for an International Police Task Force (IPTF), as UNCIVPOL 
operation under the auspices of the United Nations. Last, but most important for 
the purposes of this paper, Annex 4 of the GFAP provides for the Constitution 
of the renamed state “Bosnia and Herzegovina”, thereby replacing the previous 
constitution of the internationally recognized former “Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina” with its roots in the communist system. 
Annex 4, like any other modern constitution therefore regulates the basic 
legal system of BiH in terms of institutions and structures. Moreover, it includes 
a rudimentary human rights catalogue, but in Annex I to Annex 4 alltogether 
fifteen international human rights instruments were declared directly applicable 
in BiH, not the least the UN human rights instruments as well as the human 
and minority rights instruments within the Council of Europe framework. If 
analyzed both from a constitutional law and political science perspective, it 
becomes clear that this constitution, having been drafted by US-American 
lawyers during the negotiations in Dayton/Ohio, was conceived as a political 
compromise and institutional umbrella for the cease-fire on the ground with 
many legal lacunae to be filled later by the competent institutions of either the 
legislative or judicial branches. 
A sketch of the institutional structures foreseen in the GFAP in general and 
Annex 4 in particular will show the following picture: 
2. 1. The legal fiction of Article I of the Dayton Constitution, as Annex 4 is 
colloquially called, declares that “The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
... shall continue its legal existence under international law as a state 
with its internal structure modified as provided herein…,” that is, that 
RS and FBiH shall form the two “Entities” of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
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according to paragraph 3. This means in less diplomatic language: the 
secessionist and war-faring RS is recognized, not necessarily as a sovereign 
state in terms of international law, but as a separate, political Entity 
with its territory occupied by military aggression, ethnic cleansing and 
genocide in spite of the fact that the UN Security Council had strongly 
opposed the recognition of new, in my interpretation also internal, 
borders created by violence.12 
2. 2. Following the model of the constitution of FBiH as part of the 
Washington Agreement, the Dayton Constitution introduces proportional 
representation and veto powers in the legislative and executive powers for 
the so called “constituent peoples”, that is, Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs, 
unlike the FBiH constitution, however, not for “Others.” Hence, Article 
IV provides for a bi-cameral parliament, with a House of Representatives 
whose members are to be directly elected in a ratio of 2:1 from the 
territories of FBiH and RS. The House of Peoples is to be composed 
on the basis of the ethno-national parity principle by five Bosniacs, five 
Croats, and five Serbs through indirect elections. According to Article V, 
there shall be a `collective´ Presidency, again to be composed through 
direct elections on the basis of ethno-national parity with one Bosniac, 
one Croat, and one Serb member, whereas the provisions for the so 
called “Council of Ministers” provide for ethno-national representation 
in a more indirect way. Hence, the only institution at state level with 
no textual prescription for ethno-national representation is, according 
to Article VI, the Constitutional Court of BiH to be composed of nine 
judges, six of them to be elected by the parliaments of FBiH and RS 
again in a ratio of 2:1 and three international judges to be selected and 
appointed by the President of the European Court of Human Rights, 
established under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
However, as can be seen from this strange rule for the composition of 
what became called domestic judges in colloquial language, their election 
12  See UNSC-Res. 713, 25th September 1991.
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by the parliaments of the Entities and not by the parliament at state 
level, ensures a de facto ethno-national composition to this day with 
two Serbs from RS, and two Bosniac and two Croats each from FBiH. 
2. 3. Again in deviation from the FBiH constitution, Article IV paragraph 3 
and sub-paragraphs d) and e) do not only provide for a so called “vital 
national interest” veto in the House of Peoples with the effect of a 
suspensive veto in the legislative process which can be overcome by a 
mediating mechanism in parliament or, in the final analysis, by a legally 
binding ruling of the Constitutional Court. Moreover, subparagraph d) 
enables also a veto mechanism, called “Entity veto”, with absolute effect. 
Hence, practically speaking, nine representatives from RS or eighteen 
from FBiH can block any decision-making in the House of Peoples. 
2. 4. Finally, what makes BiH one of the weakest federations worldwide, is the 
division of powers between the so called common institutions at state 
level, described above, and the Entity level. Article III of the Dayton 
Constitution contains a general system of allocation of powers with a 
list of enumerated powers on behalf of the “institutions of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina” so that all those powers not contained in the list shall be 
those of the Entities. From a comparative constitutional law perspective, 
it is striking that most of the powers which are considered essential for 
state sovereignty, namely defence, police, or fiscal policy, are not in the 
list of enumerated powers so that they belong to the Entities. Article VIII 
even entrenches an almost absolute fiscal dependence of the “common 
institutions” because they have to be financed from the revenues of the 
Entitities. 
In conclusion, as can be seen from the description above, with the territorial 
division into two Entities along ethnic lines created by war and ethnic cleansing, 
the strict corporate13 power sharing model entrenched in the constitutions of 
13 Corporate, in contrast to liberal, power sharing is based on the legally entrenched ethno-national predetermi-
nation of governmental positions, frequently called `ethnic keys´ in scholarly literature. This distinction can be 
traced back to Arend Lijphart, “Self-determination versus pre-determination of ethnic minorities in power-sharing 
systems,” reprinted in Will Kymlicka (ed.), The Rights of Minority Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). 
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both FBiH and BiH, and almost no prescriptions for the institutional mechanisms 
on Entity level or for the coordination and cooperation between Entities and 
state institutions, the Dayton constitution is based on a political compromise 
which mirrored the military situation on the ground in terms of a cease-fire 
arrangement. Moreover, the Dayton constitution like the entire GFAP with its 
legal nature as a multilateral international treaty entered into force without 
parliamentary ratification process, nor is the authentic English text officially 
translated into any of the three official languages in use in BiH. 
This must, in line with the title of this paper, trigger the question, why shall 
and how can such a state and constitution, imposed by international actors 
and with the bare minimum institutional mechanisms, be kept together? Who 
and what are possible integrative forces, if it shall not be doomed to become a 
“defective democracy” at best?14 What are the basic values and (international) 
constitutional law principles in terms of transitional and social justice, possibly 
requiring not only political stability through negative peace and co-existence in 
an ethnically deeply divided society, but also positive peace through cooperation 
and (re-) integration in terms of reconciliation and social cohesion?15
III. THE ROLE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT IN A 
DIVIDED SOCIETY
From the perspective which considers legal systems as peaceful dispute 
resolution mechanisms based on rule of law and not only ethno-national political 
power sharing because these two principles and their translation into legal and 
institutional mechanisms might come into conflict, it goes without saying that 
it is the basic function of a supreme or constitutional court in such a rule of law 
system that judges should always bear the integration of law, state and society in 
mind, even if they have to adjudicate, like the Canadian Supreme Court, a claim 
for secession as this was the case in Reference re Secession of Quebec ([1998] 2 
14 On the concept of defective democracies see Wolfgang Merkel, “Embedded and defective democracies,” De-
mocratization 11, no. 5 (2004). 
15 See, in particular, Bronwyn Anne Leebaw, “The Irreconcilable Goals of Transitional Justice,” Human Rights Quar-
terly 30, no. 1 (2008). 
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SCR 217). As we will see from the case law of the Constitutional Court of BiH, 
this was even more so the case in BiH as a state and society still in transition 
after a protracted violent conflict. Since I have analyzed the implementation 
of the GFAP in terms of the functioning of the political party system in detail 
somewhere else,16 I will focus in this paper on the comparative constitutional law 
issues for a constitutional system with a centralized judicial review mechanism. 
Moreover, I will address the perennial questions of judicial review with regard to 
the swing of the pendulum between judicial self-restraint and judicial activism 
in a court with a communist heritage on the one hand, and the permanent 
equal participation of foreign judges on the other which makes the Bosnian 
Constitutional Court unique worldwide.
What are, therefore, the underlying notions and premises for such a court 
when we speak about liberal democracy and market economy, or individual 
liberal and political human rights in relation with socio-economic and cultural 
rights? Due to the historic legacy and the involvement of judges coming from 
different constitutional cultures even in Europe (the foreign judges coming from 
Sweden, France, and Austria, each from a different `legal family´ with different 
systems of judicial review) and different ideological viewpoints or legal-theoretical 
assumptions in terms of positive law, we therefore have a broad range of possible 
alternatives with regard to questions of social justice, fairness and equality. And 
what role in particular shall foreigners, sitting with equal rights and duties on the 
bench of a national constitutional court, play or is this simply a violation of the 
principle of state sovereignty, as this could be heard as a reproach by politicians 
and media in BiH, in particular if this is a system imposed on the country?
3.1. Constitutional Unity or Pluralism: The Contested Institutional Position 
of the Constitutional Court 
First of all, we have to clarify in howfar Article VI, paragraph 3 of the Dayton 
constitution foresees a hybrid mix of the US-American and the Austrian-
German systems of judicial review. 
16  See Marko, “Defective Democracy,“ fn 4. 
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3. 1.1. Article VI.3: 
The Constitutional Court shall uphold this Constitution. 
a) The Constitutional Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to decide any 
dispute that arises under this Constitution between the Entities or 
between Bosnia and Herzegovina and an Entity or Entities, or between 
institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including but not limited to: 
•  Whether an Entity’s decision to establish a special parallel relationship 
with a neighboring state is consistent with this Constitution, 
including provisions concerning the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
• Whether any provision of an Entity’s constitution or law is consistent 
with this Constitution. 
Disputes may be referred only by a member of the Presidency, by the 
Chair of the Council of Ministers, by the Chair or Deputy Chair of either 
chamber of the Parliamentary Assembly, by one-fourth of the members 
of either chamber of the Parliamentary Assembly, or by one-fourth of 
either chamber of a legislature of an Entity. 
b) The Constitutional Court shall also have appellate jurisdiction over issues 
under this Constitution arising out of a judgment of any other court in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
c) The Constitutional Court shall have jurisdiction over issues referred 
by any court in Bosnia and Herzegovina concerning whether a law, on 
whose validity its decision depends, is compatible with this Constitution, 
with the European Convention for Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms and its Protocols, or with the laws of Bosnia and Herzegovina; 
or concerning the existence of or scope of a general rule of public 
international law pertinent to the court´s decision.” 
In particular Article VI.3.a) provides a mechanism for what is called in 
continental European constitutional systems a centralized abstract judicial 
review procedure. As can be seen from the text, there is no requirement for 
a dispute between private parties before ordinary civil or criminal law courts, 
but the Constitutional Court of BiH functions as a final umpire on disputes 
between state institutions either on Entity level or between institutions 
of the Entities and the so-called common institutions on state level. In 
contrast, Article VI. 3. b) foresees a concrete judicial review procedure with 
the Constitutional Court as court of final instance, but no power of the 
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lower courts to adjudicate on the constitutionality of laws to be applied in 
the case at hand as can be seen from Article VI. 3. b). 
In conclusion, in both abstract and concrete review cases the rulings and 
judgments of the Constitutional Court with a monopoly to review all sorts 
of legal acts whether they are in conformity with the constitution, are legally 
binding not only for the parties, but de facto also serve as a `precedent´ and, 
if necessary, will abrogate the law in force. Hence, the Bosnian-Herzegovinian 
system of judicial review resembles more the Austrian-German model of 
judicial review than the US-system of `diffuse´ judicial review where judges 
at all levels can set aside legal provisions which they deem inconsistent 
with the constitution. As I have outlined somewhere else in detail17, these 
comparatively summarising statements above became true, however, only 
after having established the respective rules by case law of the Constitutional 
Court itself after disputes with the other institutions, in particular the Human 
Rights Chamber, the Entity Supreme and Constitutional Courts and, finally, 
also the High Representative, all of whom had contested the competence of 
the Constitutional Court of BiH to rule on appeal against their decisions.  
3.2. The Case-law of the Constitutional Court regarding Socio-economic 
Rights
Hence, I will focus on two judgments of the Constitutional Court and 
the respective reasoning of the majority and dissenting opinions in order 
to uncover the ideological and legal-theoretical underpinnings concerning 
the interpretation, in particular methods of interpretation, of liberal human 
rights, including socio-economic rights in the context of the various spheres 
of transformation already mentioned above. 
3.2.1. Case No. U-5/98
Already in 1998, the then Chair of the Presidency, Alija Izetbegović, 
submitted a request for judicial review with the allegation that more than 
17 See Joseph Marko, “Five Years of Constitutional Jurisprudence in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A First Balance,” 
in European Diversity and Autonomy Papers, 7/2004, accessed 1 September 2019 www.eurac.edu/en/research/
autonomies/minrig/publications/Pages/European-Autonomy-and-Diversity-Papers-(EDAP).aspx. 
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twenty provisions of the Entity Constitutions were not in conformity with 
the Dayton Constitution because the Entity parliaments had violated their 
obligation from Article XII, paragraph 2 to bring Entity constitutions in line 
with the Dayton constitution within three months. After more than two 
years of deliberation, this case, No. U-5/98, was handed down in 2000 in 
the form of four partial decisions.18 Many of the claims made affected the 
institutional design at Entity level described above so that this request for 
judicial review was–seen from a political perspective–also an attack on the 
political compromise concluded in Dayton and constitutionally entrenched 
with the strict ethno-national power dividing system, in particular the 
territorial division and, in effect, the ethno-national homogenization of 
institutions at the Entity level with its effects seen as main obstacles for 
the reconstruction of the state and the economy. However, in terms of 
constitution-building and institution-engineering, the architects of Dayton 
had also insisted on the return of refugees and IDPs, the restitution of 
property and, in particular, the legal obligation following from Annex VII, 
Article II: “19. Parties undertake to create in their territories the political, 
economic, and social conditions conducive to the voluntary return and 
harmonious reintegration of refugees and displaced persons, without any 
preference for any particular group.” 
As one immediately can see from this quote, the provisions of the entire 
GFAP as a political compromise can have either a static effect, with the 
ethno-national, power dividing territorial and institutional elements trying 
to preserve the status quo at the time of the conclusion of the truce, or a 
dynamic effect to be based on the return of refugees and IDPs if seen as 
a positive state duty to create the necessary social, economic and political 
conditions for their reintegration and thus the re-establishment of a 
multicultural society as it had existed before the war. The entire legal structure 
18 See Official Gazette of BiH, Nr. 11/00, Nr. 17/00, Nr. 23/00 and Nr. 36/00. All decisions with concurring and dis-
senting opinions are also published on the webpage of the Constitutional Court www.ustavnisud.ba., accessed 
August 18, 2019. 
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and therefore the political compromise in Dayton was obviously based on a 
constitutional “open-endedness and ambiguity”19 which provided the ground 
for the judicialization of politics and put the Constitutional Court under 
enormous political pressure.20 
It is, therefore, all the more important to ref lect on the methods of 
interpretation in this case and to clarify which different normative force 
was given to different types of constitutional provisions? There is the rather 
abstract language of the preambular provisions of Annex 4 referring to 
the promotion of “the general welfare and economic growth through the 
protection of private property and the promotion of a market economy” in 
a situation of transformation from a communist to a democratic system. 
However, there are the only seemingly much more concrete constitutional 
rules laid down in the enumeration of liberal human rights in Article II 
of the Dayton constitution, guaranteeing a “right to property” in general 
and the “right” of all refugees and IDPs “to freely to return to their homes 
of origin” and “the right, in accordance with Annex 7 the the General 
Framework Agreement, to have restored to them the property of which they 
were deprived in the course of hostilities since 1991 and to be compensated 
for any such property that cannot be restored to them.” 
Following from the request of Alija Izetbegović to abrogate Articles 58 and 
59 of the RS constitution as violating these constitutional principles and 
rights, not only the meaning of the normative principle of a market economy, 
but also the normative substance of the right to property became a matter 
of strong dispute which was decided by the majority of the Constitutional 
Court in Partial Decision 2 of case No. U-5/98. 
19 See Michel Rosenfeld, “Constitutional Identity,” in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law, eds. 
Michel Rosenfeld and András Sajó (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 764.
20 See also the reviews of and comments about these judgments by Carsten Stahn, “Die Verfassungsrechtliche 
Pflicht zur Gleichstellung der drei Ethnischen Volksgruppen in den Bosnischen Teilrepubliken – Neue Hoffnung 
für das Friedensmodell von Dayton? [The Constitutional Obligation to Guarantee Collective Equality of the Three 
Ethnic Groups in the Bosnian Entities – New Hope for the Model of Dayton?]” Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 
und Völkerrecht 60, no. 3-4 (2000); International Crisis Group, “Implementing Equality: The `Constituent Peoples´ 
Decision in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Balkans Report, No. 128, 16 April 2002; Anna Morawiec Mansfield, “Ethnic 
but equal: the quest for a new democratic order in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Columbia Law Review 103 (2003). 
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The contested provisions read as follows: 
Article 58, paragraph 1
Property rights and obligations relating to socially-owned resources 
and the conditions of transforming the resources into other forms of 
ownership shall be regulated by law.
Article 59
Natural resources, urban construction sites, real estate and goods of 
particular economic, cultural and historical significance determined by 
law to be of general interest, shall be state-owned. 
Certain goods of general interest may also be privately owned property 
under the conditions determined by law.
... 
As one can see from the text, there are the terms and concepts of “socially-
owned”, “state-owned” and “privately owned property” and their relationship to 
be clarified by interpretation. As a precondition, what normative force, if any, 
does the language of a preambular provision with its reference to economic 
growth and a market economy have?21 Can the preamble of the Dayton 
constitution serve as a standard of review for the Entities constitutions? 
Then what is the normative content of a right to property? Is it – in the 
classic liberal tradition – only a negative individual human right against 
state interference and what are then the limits of state interference? Or 
can it also be more than a negative individual right and create even positive 
obligations in systematic interpretation with the text of Article II of Annex 
7 quoted above?
The majority of the judges followed the opinion written by the judge-
rapporteur in this case, the author of this paper, by arguing that all 
constitutional provisions, that is, also the preambular provisions, establish 
“basic constitutional principles and goals for the functioning of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina … that must be perceived as constitutional guidelines or 
21 On the contestation about the normative force of preambles in constitutions see Liav Orgad, “The preamble in 
constitutional interpretation,” I•CON 8, no.4 (2010). 
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limitations for the exercise of the responsibilities of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and the Entities.” (§ 13). In conclusion, the majority argues under §§ 14 
and 15, that there are at least two interpretative doctrines following from 
the constitutional principles and rights which must serve as a standard for 
judicial review: 
First, the right to private property is not only an individual right, but also 
an “institutional safeguard” clause: 
“Demonstrated by the relationship between `the protection of privately 
owned property´ and a market economy in the text of the Preamble 
and Article II of the Constitution of BiH, the right to property is not 
only an individual right, which requires judicial protection against any 
illegitimate state interference, but also an institutional safeguard as one 
of the prerequisites for a functioning market economy.” 
Second, there is a an absolute limitation against state interference into 
human rights, originally developed by German constitutional law as so called 
Wesensgehaltssperre, that is, the absolute limitation to infringe the essence 
of a human right even through democratic legislation: 
It follows from the case law of the European Court of Human Rights 
that in balancing the demands of the community’s general interests, 
the State‘s interference with property rights and the requirements of the 
protection of individual rights, that such a fair balance presupposes the 
possibility of a balance, i.e. the factual existence of goods in privately 
owned property. If privately owned property can be reduced to next to 
nothing through legislation by nationalising, for instance, entire fields 
of industries, such legislation would fundamentally infringe on the right 
to property, and in particular, as it is viewed as a necessary requirement 
of a market economy expressly foreseen by the Constitution of BiH. 
Therefore, in the final analysis, the supremacy of the Constitution of 
BiH in accordance with Article III.3 (b), which supersedes, inter alia, 
the Constitutions of the Entities, would no longer have any reasonable 
meaning if it allowed the abolishment of privately owned property. This 
idea is expressed in the case law of Central European constitutional 
courts as `in no case may the essence of a basic right be encroached 
upon´, thereby establishing an absolute restriction on the infringement 
of constitutionally guaranteed rights through legislation.
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By applying these standards of review, the Court argued under § 17 that the 
constitutional category of “socially owned” property, which - as a legacy of 
the former Titoist-communist self-management system – denies both private 
persons as well as the state the legal status to be considered the owner of 
property, can no longer be considered to conform to the requirements of the 
Dayton constitution outlined above, because it creates, in theory and practice, 
serious obstacles for any privatization process in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
in particular for foreign direct investment to create sustainable economic 
growth and thus “to establish a properly functional market economy.” 
However, following from judicial self-restraint, the majority of the Court also 
argued that the challenged provision could be read in two ways, either as 
a mere legislative authorization of the RS parliament or as a constitutional 
duty to transform all socially owned property into either private or state 
owned property in order to promote a mixed economy on the basis of a 
market system. The majority therefore argued on the basis of a constitutional 
doctrine to be found in many federal systems that a challenged provision 
must be upheld as long as it can be interpreted in conformity with the higher 
ranking law, so that the second alternative has to be applied and therefore it 
upheld the challenged provision of Article 58, paragraph 1 RS constitution. 
In his dissenting opinion, judge Hans Danelius from Sweden and a former 
judge of the Swedish Supreme Court with, however, no tradition of 
constitutional judicial review and also a former member of the European 
Commission of Human Rights, did, based on his experience and the legal 
doctrines developed by these bodies, deny the first rule elaborated by the 
majority of the Court concerning a right to property to be seen not only 
as an individual right, but also as an “institutional safeguard” clause and 
the conclusion that the contested provision of the RS constitution must be 
interpreted as a positive duty: 
Finally, with respect to the provisions in Article II of the Constitution of 
BiH, which guarantee the right to property in the context of the general 
protection of human rights, I find it natural to start the analysis by 
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referring to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention on 
Human Rights. That Article provides, inter alia, that every natural or legal 
person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions, that no 
one shall be deprived of his possessions except on specific enumerated 
conditions, and that the State shall be free to enforce such laws as it 
deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the 
general interest.
It appears from the wording of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that it is 
intended to provide protection for the individual‘s existing property. 
The provision has generally been understood not to include any right 
to acquire property, and this interpretation has been confirmed by the 
European Court of Human Rights, for instance in the case of Marckx v. 
Belgium (European Court of Human Rights, Judgment of 13 June 1979, 
Vol. No. 31). Against this background, Article 1 cannot be considered to 
impose on the State an obligation to privatise State-owned property or 
otherwise to ensure that certain property is private and not owned by 
the State or other public organs.
In Article II, paragraph 3 of the Constitution of BiH, the right to 
property appears as one of numerous enumerated human rights, and 
there seems to be no reason why the protection of the right to property 
in this paragraph should be different from the protection provided by 
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
In other words, the right to property as a human right is an individual 
right. It does not impose obligations regarding the social and economic 
system of a country. It protects the property which an individual owns 
at a given moment and does not include any right for him to acquire 
other property in the future.
Moreover, the majority of the Constitutional Court abrogated the contested 
provisions of Article 59 RS constitution based on the interpretative doctrine of 
an absolute limitation for legislation to infringe the essence of human rights: 
20 ...To declare natural resources, urban construction sites, and real 
estate to be state-owned property ex constitutione infringes on the 
very essence of privately owned property as an individual right and an 
institutional safeguard.
21. In addition, the ability to expropriate on behalf of the general interests 
of the State or society was an important element of the communist 
constitutional doctrine and must thus be viewed as a legacy of that 
period. If legislation can abolish constitutionally guaranteed rights by 
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making reference to unspecified general interests, it would ridicule the 
basic principle of the rule of law, with the Constitution as paramount, 
because there is virtually nothing which could not be construed as of 
`general´ interest. Hence, the Constitutions of the Entities must not 
grant such broadly construable legislative authorizations that could 
deprive human rights of any meaning. Such a legal technique violates 
the principle of efficiency.
3.2.2. Case No. U-19/01
In the end, the second case to be dealt with in our context is Case No. 
U-19/01. This was again an abstract review procedure challenging Article 152 
of the RS Labour Law, having been adopted in 2000. This case is of special 
interest with regard to socio-economic rights in the narrower sense, that is, 
the right to work within the framework of the right of return of refugees 
and IDPs to their homes, that is, their towns and villages, and be provided 
with the necessary conditions to make a living in their familiar surroundings.
As can be seen from the reasoning of the Constitutional Court in case No. 
U-5/98 Partial Decision 3, at § 88, one of the contextual elements established 
to judge discriminatory behaviour against returnees to RS was the discrepancy 
in numbers between so-called “minority returns”, that is, Bosniacs and Croats 
willing to return to their homes of origin now under the Serb-dominated 
adminstration of RS, and the overall numbers of returnees insofar only 
10.17% of all returnees did belong to the former category. Moreover, the 
unemployment rate among returnees was as high as 92%.22 Seen against this 
background Article 152 of the Labour Law of RS stipulated: 
Employees having an employment contract on the day of 31 December 
1991 with an employer seated on the territory which is now part of 
Republika Srpska, whose working relationship with that employer was 
illegally terminated between that date and the effective date of this 
Law, shall have the right to file a request for severance pay within three 
months from the effective date of this Law. 
22 See Nedim Kulenović, Court as a Policy-Maker?: The Role and Effects of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in Democratic Transition and Consolidation (Sarajevo: Working Paper 5/2016, Analitika, Center for 
Social Research, 2016),  46. 
Bosnia-Herzegovina: The Role of the Judiciary in A Divided Society
215Constitutional Review, Volume 5, Number 2, December 2019
Moreover, Article 158 established a commission to be appointed by the 
minister in charge of labor to finally decide on such requests with legally 
binding effect. 
The majority opinion of the Constitutional Court in this case, when reasoning 
about a possible discriminatory intent of Article 152, made even an abstract 
reference to Article 6, § 1 of ICESCR as legal source to be taken into 
consideration, but found no evidence for direct or de jure discrimination by 
the legislator of RS and therefore went on to find out whether the distinction 
made in the text of Article 152 concerning “persons or groups to be compared” 
might amount in effect to an indirect or de facto discrimination between 
Serbs, Bosniacs and Croats due to the historical context of ethnic cleansing 
when employees were dismissed or put on waiting lists on ethnic grounds. 
Hence, the majority went on to deliberate on the question whether Article 
152 could be considered to have an objective and reasonable justification and 
established that the overall aim of the contested Article is “creating legal 
certainty for those companies that ceased or reduced their activities due to 
the war, and which were after the war faced with the problem of resuming 
their work under conditions of a market economy. Such legal certainty 
may also be essential for investors in such companies and for the general 
development of the economy of Bosnia and Herzegovina” (§ 25). On the 
other hand, the reasoning goes on,
there is a right of those unlawfully dismissed or placed on a waiting list 
to be reinstated into their previous positions. Their reinstatement may 
not be possible in all cases and may largely depend on the economic 
conditions of their previous employer. Although this individual interest 
is of high importance, the Constitutional Court considers the public 
interest outlined above, could reasonably be considered to prevail (§ 26). 
As can be seen from this reasoning, the majority opinion not only ignores 
to elaborate on the meaning of the right to work, including the right of 
everyone to the opportunity to gain his/her living by work which he/she 
freely chooses according to Article 6 § 1 ICESCR in the context of Bosnia 
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and Herzegovina, but also simply applies a mere rationality test in the 
terminology of the US Supreme Court between a highly abstract public 
interest, not in any way further empirically substantiated, and the “right” 
to work, that is, to be reinstated after having been illegally dismissed on 
ethnic grounds and therefore being seriously discriminated against which 
is, moreover, linguistically denigrated to a simple “individual interest.”
It must therefore come as no surprise that the author of this paper delivered 
a dissenting opinion in this case and argued that even the majority opinion 
had recognized that the effects of past de jure discrimination are upheld by 
Article 152 RS Labor law so that the contested provision must trigger `strict 
scrutiny´ for review in the terminology of the US Supreme Court, and thus 
the application of the proportionality principle as the European equivalent 
in terms of standards of review. 
In conclusion, the dissenting opinion outlines that Article 6, § 1 ICESCR has 
to be read in conjunction with the provisions of Articles II. 5 of the Dayton 
constitution as a guaranteed right, not simply an individual interest so that 
the “balancing” of guaranteed rights against public interests requires that 
all elements of the proportionality test are strictly met. Hence, it has to be 
tested not only whether the means employed are legitimate and appropriate 
to achieve the objective, but also whether they are the least restrictive in 
the guarantee of rights that are available. Seen in this light, Article 152 does 
not meet the standards of the proportionality test. Its legitimacy must be 
contested since the recognized illegal dismissals in the past, which formed a 
part of an organized campaign of ethnic cleansing, are upheld and thereby 
legalized, creating new discrimination. Second, severance pays instead 
of reinstatement and the establishment of a commission instead of an 
independent court in the meaning of Article 6 ECHR to finally decide on 
requests are not the least restrictive means possible:
16. In times of prosperity, it would certainly be easier to maintain the 
present workforce while at the same time reinstate former employees. 
Also, some areas or branches of the labour market may face greater 
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difficulties than others. However, it is a constitutional imperative of 
utmost importance not to uphold discriminatory practices or even create 
new legislation which discriminates in effect. Thus, the economic burden 
as a result of the war has to be proportionately distributed between all 
parts of the population as well as between the private sector and the 
state budget. An approach which transforms this constitutional obligation 
into an affirmative action plan to re-employ at least a certain number of 
Bosniac and Croat men and women would be less burdensome on the 
victims of discrimination while at the same time taking into account the 
present economic difficulties. Most importantly, it would give returnees 
the same chance to access the limited available positions as the majority 
Serb population presently have, and thereby bring the right to return 
into balance with the public interest in a sustainable economy. Lastly, 
such legal guidelines on a proportionate distribution of the existing 
positions according to criteria of professional qualification would meet 
the obligation of the public authorities to facilitate the return process.
Hence, the conclusion of the dissenting opinion: 
17. In view of feasible alternatives which the majority Decision does 
not take into consideration, Article 152 of Labour Law of the RS, 
by categorically excluding any reinstatement nor providing for any 
equivalent solution, cannot be considered a necessary and proportionate 
means. Article 152 of Labour Law of the RS does not find a reasonable 
relationship of proportionality between the means employed (symbolic 
compensation and exclusion of any reinstatement) and the aim sought 
to be realised (compensation for suffered discrimination under tight 
economic conditions). It is thus discriminatory and in violation of Article 
II.4 in conjunction with Article II.5 of Constitution and Article 6 § 1 
ICESCR, Annex I of Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
As can be seen not only from these judgments,23 most of the problems of the 
reconstruction of the state and economy and reconciliation of society in terms of 
the civilian implementation of the GFAP were brought before the Constitutional 
Court of BiH. Seen from hindsight, the Constitutional Court of BiH was, 
through the judicialization of politics in a process of triple transformation after 
a terrible war, necessarily a very active court and thus, together with the High 
23  See in particular the more than 1000 pages commentary by Nedim Ademović and Christian Steiner, Constitution 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Commentary (Sarajevo, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2010). 
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Representatives in BiH, probably one of the two institutions constantly working 
for the reintegration of state and society inspite of the de facto ethno-national 
composition among `domestic´ judges and the participation of three international 
judges. Concerning the role of the latter in processes of constitutional adjudication, 
two phenomena must be highlighted. In terms of human rights protection, their 
role was to serve as translators and mediators for the domestic judges, because 
all of them had been trained under the communist system and therefore had 
no experience with the ECHR and its implementation in the member states of 
the Council of Europe or the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. 
In this regard, all the judges irrespective of their ethnic feelings developed an 
esprit de corps concerning the protection of liberal, that is, negative human 
rights against infringements by public authorities. 
Secondly, and astonishingly, as could be seen from the description and analysis 
of the two cases above, most conflicts of interpretation in terms of ideological 
underpinnings and legal-theoretical assumptions concerning the relationship 
between liberal, negative rights and social rights and corresponding positive 
duties of state authorities did not flare up between domestic judges trained under 
the communist regime and international judges coming from liberal-democratic 
regimes, but among the international judges themselves coming from different 
legal cultures with different practices of judicial review. However, as can be seen 
from the overview on the case law of the Constitutional Court of BiH analysed 
by Ademović and Steiner, quoted above in footnote 17, questions and problems 
of socio-economic rights in the narrow meaning did not play a prominent role 
in the adjudication of the Constitutional Court of BiH, and if, only in connection 
with problems of discrimination on the basis of ethnic origin. 
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